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Pathologies in international policy transfer: The case of the OECD tax transparency initiative  
 
The importance of international organizations to the development and diffusion of 
international policy norms is widely recognised but is increasingly tempered by an 
appreciation of the pathologies of policy transfer. Using a case study of the OECD’s 
campaign to promote transparency in global tax affairs this paper identifies a new and 
relatively distinctive form of dysfunctional policy transfer. Specifically we argue that 
international organizations face bureaucratic incentives to promote weak or lowest common 
denominator standards in order to maximize their prospects of brokering successful 
international agreements. However the paper also notes that while international organizations 
may have a short term interest in promoting weak standards, their longer term legitimacy is 
often tied to the effectiveness of the standards they promote. We argue that this dynamic 









The central role of international organizations in promoting international policy transfer and 
norm diffusion through the provision of discursive space and venues for sustained 
institutional and professional interaction is now widely recognised (Stone 2004: 555). 
However, somewhat surprisingly, given the manifold references to its  prominence in  policy 
and norm diffusion (see for example, Benson and Jordan 2011), only recently has the OECD 
been subject to systematic academic scrutiny (Mahon and McBride 2008, Woodward 2009, 
Martens and Jacobi 2010, Carroll and Kellow 2011; Pal 2012). In keeping with many 
international organizations, but unlike the other major multilateral economic institutions such 
as the IMF, WTO and World Bank, the OECD lacks any coercive instruments to pursue its 
mandate of achieving “the highest sustainable economic growth and employment and a rising 
standard of living” for its members and enhancing development opportunities of non-
members (OECD 1960). Instead the OECD’s effectiveness as an institution of global 
governance rests upon its ability to promote policy transfer and conformity with OECD 
norms through peer review and other reputation-based compliance strategies. In turn the 
OECD’s aptitude for this rests on its reputation for technical expertise, its transgovernmental 
structure and linkages to member and non-member states (Mahon and McBride 2008). 
The growing recognition of the role international organizations play in knowledge 
dissemination has been accompanied by an appreciation of the limits of “soft law” and how 
this might produce policy transfer failures. First, secure in the belief that no material damage 
will result from non-compliance with international initiatives, scholars within the neorealist 
tradition highlight the existence of “sham regimes”, where states commit to adopting a 
regulatory standard at the international level yet intentionally fail to implement it 
domestically (Drezner 2007). For example, the OECD’s Multilateral Agreement on 
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Investment (MAI) initiative of the late 1990s foundered upon the refusal of member states to 
implement agreements in order to appease powerful domestic interests (see Williams 2008). 
A second related form of policy transfer pathology results when  the veto power of domestic 
interest groups encourages states to engage in “mock compliance” (Walter 2008) adopting the 
form but not the substance of the agreement entered, as arguably many jurisdictions did in 
response to the OECD’s initial proposals to promote tax transparency. A third type of failed 
policy transfer is when states commit to and implement an international standard, either under 
duress, or in the hope of attracting diplomatic kudos, only to find that the regulatory 
framework is costly,  unnecessary or hopelessly ill-suited to their domestic political 
circumstances. For instance, Sharman (2011) demonstrates how states possessing negligible 
financial centres have nevertheless sought to comply with the Financial Action Task Force’s 
anti money laundering principles. 
This paper builds on this nascent literature on dysfunctional and counterproductive policy 
transfer by identifying and assessing a fourth type of policy transfer failure which arises when 
international organizations promote “sterile masterpieces” (Pal 2012: 119), weak or lowest 
common denominator standards which may undermine the stated objective of the policy in 
question. This occurs when international organizations privilege reaching an international 
agreement at the expense of the effectiveness of the subsequent regime. While such outcomes 
are commonplace in the pragmatic cut and thrust of real world diplomacy, where 
international organizations such as the OECD are under pressure to deliver outcomes rather 
than focus on their effectiveness, we argue that the extant literature has largely ignored its 
potential for dysfunctional policy transfer and the processes which drive it (Marsh and 
Sharman 2009, Sharman 2010). This is especially the case in areas such as taxation which 
touch upon sensitive areas of national sovereignty (Eccleston 2011). 
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The analysis which follows departs from the liberal-rationalist tradition which has come to 
dominate the literature on policy transfer and the assumption that developing and 
implementing agreed standards results in improved governance and policy success (Alderson 
2001: 424, Marsh and Sharman 2009: 282). While we acknowledge the recent critical turn in 
the international relations literature on policy diffusion which argues that developing 
countries in particular may adopt inappropriate and counterproductive policies owing to 
coercive pressures or the need to enhance prestige or legitimacy (Lal 2001, Stone 2004, 
Sharman 2011), we focus on the related question of why and under what circumstances 
international organizations would play an active role in this process. Here the article builds 
on insights from Barnett and Finnemore’s (2004) study of international organizations as 
bureaucracies and the associated claim that international organizations are agents of their own 
transformation. It is argued that the policy positions promoted by organizations such as the 
OECD cannot be established deductively but should be regarded as being the complex 
product of the internal culture of an organization combined with the changing interests of 
member states and the broader legitimacy and effectiveness of the programs they promote. 
Stone’s (2011) theory of international organizations, with its emphasis on their need to 
balance great power interests and legitimacy, provides a useful framework for analysing how 
competing tensions shape the OECD’s evolving policy agenda in relation to international 
taxation.  
Our analysis begins with a brief critical discussion of the policy transfer literature in global 
governance. The article then summarises the OECD’s role in developing and disseminating 
new international standards for tax information exchange in response to mounting concerns 
about the role of tax havens in facilitating international tax evasion. While this initiative has 
been a spectacular success in terms of promoting bi-lateral Tax Information Exchange 
Agreements (TIEAs), the OECD’s standard has attracted derision from those who believe it is 
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counterproductive because it confers legitimacy on jurisdictions which meet the standard 
while doing little to enhance tax transparency. The second half of the article outlines this 
critique and provides evidence that complying with the OECD’s standard may have little 
impact on international tax evasion before assessing why the OECD may have been engaging 
in dysfunctional transfer.  
The final section of the paper examines the OECD’s somewhat unexpected 2012 decision to 
endorse new and more rigorous standards for tax information exchange. We argue that this 
development is significant in that it provides insights into how the policy preferences of 
international organizations evolve and how this impacts on the policy prescriptions and 
norms which they disseminate. Moreover, this case study alerts those examining the process 
of dysfunctional policy transfer not to be hasty in declarations of failure. The iterative nature 
of work at international organizations, especially the OECD, requires sensitivity to the 
possibility that by making incremental gains through victory in smaller, peripheral battles 
they are wheeling the battalions into position for victory in a longer and wider war. 
Policy Transfer in Global Governance  
Social scientists of all hues had long accepted the reality of policy transfer between different 
temporal and spatial contexts. In recent decades however, episodes of policy transfer have 
exploded as the revolution in information and communication technology increased the ease 
with which policymakers could interact. This, combined with broader debates about the 
extent to which economic, political and cultural integration has driven policy convergence 
resulted in a burgeoning literature which sought to understand what motivated policy transfer, 
what is transferred, by whom and under what circumstances. Predictably each of the major 
disciplines in the social sciences has developed distinctive methods and theories for analysing 
this phenomenon resulting in diverse findings concerning its causes and consequences (see 
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Marsh and Sharman 2009; McCann and Ward 2012). Perhaps the most relevant approaches 
for the purposes of understanding the role of international organizations in the creation, 
dissemination and adoption of policy knowledge are those developed in political science, 
namely the public policy literature on policy transfer and the international relations 
scholarship on policy diffusion. These approaches share the idea that policy transfer refers to 
“the process by which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions 
and ideas in one political system (past or present) is used in the development of policies 
administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political system” (Dolowitz and 
Marsh 2000). Their differences largely lie in scale and method. Whereas the domestic policy 
transfer literature employs case studies and qualitative methods to identify and examine the 
processes and interactions which lead one jurisdiction to emulate the policies of another, the 
policy diffusion literature tends to use large-n quantitative methods to establish the degree of 
policy convergence, either intentional or driven by structural processes, across large sets of 
states.  
 These literatures, including that on dysfunctional policy transfer, do however suffer from 
being too state-centric in that they maintain that weak states adopt, either by direct coercion 
or mimicry, damaging policies which are devised by and serve the interests of powerful 
actors in the international system. While there is a good deal of truth in such claims, our 
contention is that international organizations themselves are partially autonomous actors in 
world politics who have interests, agendas and resources which are independent from those of 
their member states. In particular, an international organization’s constant struggle for 
relevance, issues and resources acts as an incentive for them to develop and disseminate 
‘weak’ standards and regimes which notionally address pressing governance problems but are 
benign and politically palatable in practise. This dynamic means that international 
organizations can be agents of dysfunctional transfer quite independently of powerful states 
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in the international system. It is this process which we analyse in the case study of the 
OECD’s promotion of standards designed to improve international tax transparency. 
The OECD and Tax Transparency: Triumph or Tragedy? 
Created in 1961, the OECD has played a crucial role in the development of the international 
tax regime. Initially the focus was on promoting its Model Tax Convention, a prototype for 
negotiating bilateral tax agreements first developed by its predecessor the OEEC in 1958. 
More recently the organization and its Centre for Tax Policy and Administration (CTPA) has 
assumed a wider remit through leading international debate and promoting best practice in 
relation to an ever expanding range of tax issues (Picciotto 1992, Woodward 2009: 87-89, 
Carroll and Kellow 2011). Whereas the original aim of the Model Convention was to simplify 
the tax issues relating to transnational commerce and prevent the double taxation of 
international business transactions, by the late 1980s the international community and the 
OECD (1987) had become increasingly concerned about the causes and consequences of 
international tax avoidance and evasion and what the organization later defined as ‘harmful 
tax competition’ (see Table 1). These concerns assumed a tangible form with the release of 
the OECD’s report Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue (OECD 1998). For 
excellent summaries see: Webb 2004, Eden and Kudrle 2005, Sharman 2006, Rixen 2008, 
Palan et al. 2010: 210-221). This ambitious initiative aimed to identify tax havens, defined as 
low or no tax jurisdictions that were unwilling to hold or exchange tax and financial data with 
overseas tax authorities seeking information concerning the offshore affairs of their residents. 
The hope was that identified tax havens would be persuaded to adopt the OECD’s standard 
for information exchange. However if such voluntary compliance did not eventuate then 
sanctions or other “defensive measures” were threatened (Eccleston 2012, Ch.3). 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE  
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By the mid-2000s the OECD’s tax transparency project was floundering amidst steadfast 
resistance from tax havens within and beyond the OECD, growing reticence from the Bush 
Administration in the United States, and opposition from the transnational tax planning 
industry (Webb 2004). Indeed the agenda which had been launched with such optimism in 
1998 was rightly characterised as being the victim of a “politics without conviction” because 
in order to sustain waning support for the project the OECD was forced to dilute the standard 
to the point that it was widely regarded as being ineffective (Palan et al. 2010). Yet contrary 
to expectations, over the past five years, the OECD has exploited  the global financial crisis 
to achieve considerable progress in promoting tax transparency, at least insofar as brokering 
bilateral information exchange agreements including TIEAs and Double Tax Treaties (DTCs) 
are concerned. Until 2006 a mere 11 OECD TIEAs had been signed, but renewed enthusiasm 
for tax transparency is such that by mid-2011 659 had been agreed with this number swelling 
to 1100 TIEA/DTCs by mid-2013 (OECD 2013a, 6).  
In addition to the proliferation of TIEAs, the G20’s April 2009 meeting requested the OECD 
to “develop an effective peer-review mechanism to assess compliance” and provided 
dedicated funding to revitalise the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of 
Information for Tax Purposes (Global Forum) for this purpose (Porter and Rubio-Vega 
2011). The revised Global Forum was established in September 2009 with members agreeing 
to important substantive and procedural changes to the regime. First, the Global Forum 
introduced a more robust, two-staged peer review process designed to establish the extent that 
Forum members (which numbered 119 states in September 2013) fulfilled their commitments 
under the emerging tax information exchange regime. Phase one of the peer review process 
examines the merits of a jurisdiction’s legal and regulatory framework for exchanging tax 
information. If the phase one review finds that a jurisdiction has satisfactory arrangements for 
tax information exchange arrangements in place, it qualifies for a phase-two review which 
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assesses and assigns a rating to their practical effectiveness. The second phase assessment 
responds to criticisms of the original OECD regime which measured only whether the 
requisite frameworks existed, but gave no consideration to whether a jurisdiction would 
exchange information in practice. Second, the Forum requires members to submit to a post-
assessment follow-up process to ensure that jurisdictions do not backslide on their 
commitments and to keep their partners apprised of policy changes which may impair their 
ability to exchange tax information (OECD 2011b). Finally, the Global Forum has refined the 
assessment and grading criteria.  Previously a jurisdiction was regarded having “substantially 
implemented” the international standard if it had 12 TIEAs. This emphasis on an arbitrary 
quantity of agreements rather than their quality and relevance meant a jurisdiction could meet 
the standard without compromising its offshore business by entering into agreements with 
obscure states of little economic significance rather than the financial centres on which they 
rely for investment (Murphy 2010). Now the Global Forum demanded member jurisdictions 
to finalise a “network of information exchange agreements..... [with] all relevant partners”.   
The new assessment regime also moves beyond making a crude distinction between 
compliant and non-compliant jurisdictions instead evaluating conformity with individual 
elements of the international standard. As of September 2013, the Global Forum had 
completed and published 113 peer reviews covering 98 jurisdictions (OECD 2013a). Almost 
all Global Forum members have undergone a phase-one review, the vast majority of which 
were found to have satisfactory legal frameworks for tax information exchange and eligible 
for a phase-two review. The Global Forum intends to have completed the phase-two reviews 
of 50 jurisdictions and to finalise their ratings at the Global Forum’s plenary meeting in 
November 2013.  Clearly the ranking of phase 2 reports and the credibility they confer will 
be a critical test of the Global Forum’s legitimacy. 
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Collectively the G20’s endorsement of the OECD’s tax transparency agenda, the launch of the 
revised Global Forum, the rapid spread of both tax information exchange agreements and 
associated domestic reforms could be interpreted as a case of successful international policy 
transfer devised and promoted by the OECD. Indeed the Secretary General boasted of the 
organisation orchestrating a “revolution” in global tax transparency (Gurria 2009) and, two 
years later to declare that ‘the era of bank secrecy is over’ (OECD 2011a). These  conclusions 
are nevertheless challenged by those who remain sceptical about whether these developments 
will have any material impact on the international tax evasion denouncing  the OECD 
programme as “a whitewash” (Shaxson 2011) whose “creeping futility” (Meizner 2012) serves 
only to legitimise the activities of tax cheats and the industries that abet them.  One criticism in 
particular stood out, namely that the standard which the OECD promoted until 2013 was likely 
to be ineffective because it is based on exchanging information “on request” requiring tax 
authorities to identify the taxpayers and the nature of offshore accounts they are investigating 
before they can approach their counterparts abroad, precisely the thing that opaque tax 
structures are designed to obfuscate. This approach derived from compromises made to 
reassure opponents of the OECD’s initial harmful tax proposals  that they would not be 
subjected to so-called “fishing expeditions” and would only be required to provide information 
relating to specific investigations once  “all other means available in its territory” had been 
exhausted (OECD 2011a). Information exchange on request therefore is only useful in a 
relatively small number of instances where tax authorities have detailed knowledge of offshore 
schemes acquired through “whistle blowers” or through amnesties and voluntary disclosure 
schemes (such as occurred in the recent high profile UBS and LCT cases) (Spencer 2010, 
Picciotto 2011, Meinzer 2012). Ordinarily tax authorities have very limited precise knowledge 
of offshore tax evasion as senior tax official from an OECD member state explains: 
11 
 
Information exchange by request is very useful when you have a taxpayer who 
you’re pretty certain is involved in evasion through a specific jurisdiction. 
Then you can ask for information and you’d be able to get it - I’m confident 
about that, but that’s a small part of the problem because generally you don’t 
know the people who have evaded in the first place and that’s why we need 
automatic exchange of information. Otherwise they have to be in your sights 
before you can use information exchange on request and a lot of these people 
are not. They go to great efforts to not to be. (Author interview March 2010). 
In these circumstances even a well administered regime providing information exchange on 
request will only reveal the tip of the iceberg so far as international evasion is concerned. To 
paraphrase former US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld: information exchange on 
request will help counter ‘the known unknowns’ but will do little to reveal ‘the unknown 
unknowns’, which arguably represent the greatest problem. Reflecting such concerns proposals 
for a system of automatic information exchange of tax and banking information between tax 
authorities started top gather momentum (see below).  
Explaining dysfunctional transfer: a fourth pathology? 
The above case study can be categorised as an example of dysfunctional policy transfer 
instigated and implemented by the OECD. Yet the diffusion of TIEAs described above does not 
strictly conform with the pathologies of policy transfer previously outlined. First, and in 
contrast to the early years of the initiative in the late 1990s, there is less evidence that 
implementation has miscarried because of domestic opposition. Indeed the prospect of peer 
review appears to have convinced the vast majority of offshore jurisdictions to implement the 
formal legislative and administrative measures required to exchange tax information on request, 
even in places such as Switzerland where reforms have taken place in the teeth of strident 
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opposition from domestic financial groups for whom banking secrecy remains sacrosanct. 
Indeed, the OECD (2013b: 8-10) claims that Global Forum members have implemented over 
400 of the 666 recommendations made in adopted phase-one reports. Nor does the tax 
transparency initiative seem to have yielded a “sham regime” in which standards are developed 
in response to a pressing governance problem but which major powers intentionally fail to 
implement because they conflict with the national interest (Drezner 2007: 81-85). Finally, 
jurisdictions party to the Global Forum have voluntarily engaged with the process and, 
moreover, many weaker members have assumed prominent positions in the process. For 
example, Bermuda, Jersey, and the Cayman Islands belong to the 17 member Global Forum 
steering group as are developing countries like Kenya and emerging powerhouses China, India 
and Brazil. Residual concerns about the process still being pushed by powerful countries 
notwithstanding, it does not appear that this case study conforms to the final type of 
dysfunctional transfer identified in the extant literature whereby relatively weak states are 
forced to comply with standards which are imposed on them by the powerful actors in the 
international system (Sharman 2011). While accepting that existing approaches may partly 
account for the shortcomings of the OECD’s tax transparency regime, we suggest the need for a 
fourth type of dysfunctional policy transfer which acknowledges the autonomous role of 
international organizations in the development and dissemination of new international 
standards.  
Importantly it was the OECD rather than member states or any other actors in the international 
tax regime that spearheaded efforts to have tax information exchange incorporated into the 
G20’s post-financial crisis international reform agenda.  Owing to growing inter-organizational 
competition the OECD has been seizing agendas and problems to bolster its credibility and to 
shore up its finances (Carroll and Kellow 2011). Securing a leading post-financial crisis role 
alongside other international financial institutions was an ideal way of prosecuting this mission. 
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Nevertheless, high profile failures in relation to the MAI and the initial foray into tax 
transparency placed OECD under acute pressure to successfully ‘solve’ the issues it had 
identified. This context explains the OECD’s renewed enthusiasm for international tax 
regulation after the onset of the financial crisis in 2008. International tax evasion was not a 
central cause of the crisis but the OECD was able to trade on its established expertise by 
offering the newly established G20 Leaders’ Forum a developed and credible policy response. 
This was an extremely valuable political resource in late 2008 given the political pressure on 
the G20 to develop a timely retort to the crisis. In the short term, the OECD was able to exploit 
this resource advantage to win endorsement for its tax information exchange standard as well as 
securing additional financial resources to assist with its implementation. It is also important to 
acknowledge that this outcome was not inevitable but was the product of entrepreneurship by 
OECD Secretary General Gurria, aided by Jeffrey Owens, then Director of the OECD’s CTPA, 
who pushed the OECD’s international tax agenda at successive G7 and then G20 leaders’ 
meetings. In the words of one senior OECD official ‘our real impact has been in terms of 
setting a reform agenda. At the height of the crisis we were able to offer world leaders a 
considered and coherent course of action’ (Author interview September 2009).  
The OECD’s activism in the international tax arena is broadly consistent with Barnett and 
Finnemore’s account of international organizations acting independently of the states which 
created them. Similarly, either through agenda setting, supplying expert policy advice or 
through deeper processes of socialization, international organizations have the capacity to 
change the normative environment in which they are situated and, with time, the very 
preferences of states themselves (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 28, Checkel 2005).  This 
literature tends to stress cases where international organizations have been a force for ‘good’, 
with their principled agendas acting as a counterpoint to the instrumental concerns of powerful 
states. Nevertheless, it also recognizes that international organizations are not immune to the 
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bureaucratic pathologies which afflict all organizations. In their seminal work on the subject 
Barnett and Finnemore (2004: 37) acknowledge how internal competition within agencies for 
resources, staff and prestige can lead to organizational inefficiencies, however they give scant 
consideration to the effects of intensified competition amongst  the increasingly dense web of 
organizations and governance structures which defines the international arena (Yi-Chong and 
Weller 2004). Organizational rivalry and competition can potentially improve the quality of 
global governance but may also result incentive structures which privilege reaching 
international agreements over the substance and effectiveness of the resulting regime. These are 
conditions which are conducive to development of weak international standards and 
dysfunctional policy transfer. 
In the case of international tax governance the OECD proposed the benign and widely criticised 
framework of information exchange on request because it was less likely to attract the 
opprobrium which would undermine the prospects of successfully reaching an international 
agreement. In contrast, advocating a new regime based on automatic information exchange 
would have provoked staunch opposition, not only from traditional tax havens but also from 
OECD members, not least the  United States who responded to domestic opposition to the 
original tax transparency initiative by threatening to revoke its funding for the OECD (Sharman 
2006: 61). By actively promoting a relatively benign standard for tax information exchange and 
actively linking it to the post-financial crisis reform agenda the OECD has gained kudos and 
legitimacy helping to bolster member states’ financial commitment to the organization as well 
as €3 million Euro per annum in project specific, ‘part 2’ financial support for the Global 
Forum’s ongoing work (Eccleston 2012).  
In the short-run the OECD’s desire to win support for its tax information exchange agenda may 
have promoted the development and transfer of a weak standard, but this does not mean that the 
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organization can ignore critics who dismiss the standard as being ineffective. Indeed the 
ongoing viability of an organization such as the OECD is linked to its ability to balance 
political support for its programs with broader questions of legitimacy. Moreover, when the 
legitimacy of an important reform agenda is called into question then internal bureaucratic 
logic of the organization may demand policy change. This dynamic has been evident in the 
international tax arena over the past two years as the case for automatic information exchange 
for tax purposes has gained momentum forcing an accommodation on the part of the OECD. 
The final section of the paper describes these developments before concluding with an 
assessment of their theoretical implications. 
Organizational learning and legitimacy: The campaign for automatic exchange at the OECD  
For all the criticism of its preference for promoting information exchange on request as a 
“flawed standard” and a “wasted opportunity” (Christensen and Shaxson 2010, Meinzer 2012), 
the OECD’s standards have become the fulcrum of the international tax transparency regime. 
The EU, the United Nations and the IMF have all proposed variations on the OECD’s standard 
and the tax havens and transnational tax planning industry are content to support this as a 
bulwark against proposals promoting automatic exchange that “would be much more onerous” 
“with personal financial confidentiality being eliminated” (Hay 2005 as quoted in Spencer 
2010: 51). 
 Nevertheless, the forces promoting automatic information exchange were massing. The 
EU and the UN’s Commission of Experts on the Reform of the International Monetary and 
Financial System (The Stiglitz Commission) have advocated, and in the case of the EU Savings 
Tax Directive, implemented frameworks for the automatic exchange of tax information 
(Spencer 2005; UN 2009: 83-84). The growth of a transnational social movements dedicated to 
the promotion of transparency in international tax issues, embodied most notably by the Tax 
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Justice Network, widespread public anger following revelations about celebrities and 
companies avoiding taxes while they endure austerity, plus enhanced funding and status of the 
UN Tax Committee which disproportionately represents developing countries have helped 
maintain the momentum towards automatic information exchange for tax purposes. The most 
profound development in automatic information exchange however was the passage in 2010 of 
Foreign Accounts Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) in the United States.   
FATCA’s significance lies in the fact that it requires financial institutions (rather than 
foreign governments) to automatically provide tax and financial information to US tax 
authorities on the offshore interests of US tax residents or face a 30% withholding tax on all 
United States sourced income (Browning 2011). FACTA has catalysed significant changes in 
international tax governance. Together the US and 5 EU countries (UK, France, Italy, Spain 
and Germany) developed a model for the implementation of FATCA which would allow 
financial institutions to automatically report information to domestic tax authorities who would 
in turn share the information with the tax authorities in the US. Other countries began to show 
interest in similar arrangements with the US while the UK applied the FATCA template to 
negotiate automatic information exchange agreements with its Overseas Territories. In short, 
FATCA represented a “major step toward encouraging foreign governments to implement 
automatic exchange, thereby transforming the international financial architecture” (Spencer 
2010: 64). These developments also inspired EU to adopt legislative proposals that would 
expand the scope of automatic information exchange under the Savings Tax Directive to 
include dividends, capital gains and account balances.  
As the aforementioned OECD-Council of Europe Multilateral Convention attests, the 
OECD has longstanding expertise in assisting states to promote automatic information 
exchange (OECD 2012). Moreover, its 2002 Model Agreement on Exchange of Information on 
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Tax Matters (OECD 2002) and the Model Tax Agreement are open to the possibility of 
automatic information exchange. While continuing to stress that information exchange on 
request was the standard promoted by the Global Forum its interest in automatic information 
exchange now underwent a step change. A new OECD committee was created to explore ways 
in which automatic exchange provisions could be incorporated into the model standard and a 
major new report on the definition, procedures, benefits and practicalities of automatic 
information exchange was published in 2012 (OECD 2012).  In 2011, the G20 leaders had 
committed to the OECD-Council of Europe Multilateral Convention. Throughout 2012 the 
communiqués of G8 and G20 meetings quietly encouraged and endorsed the OECD’s work 
before finally, in June/July 2013, endorsing automatic information exchange as the new 
international standard and charging OECD with developing a global model to monitor its 
implementation by the end of 2014.  
Orthodox approaches would be unperturbed by such developments at the OECD, tracing them 
to changes external to the organization, especially in the prevailing patterns of power and 
interest in the international system. Undoubtedly the cumulative impact of civil society 
campaigns, rival standards being promoted by the UN and key OECD member states has 
influenced OECD policy prescriptions. Failure to adjust risked the OECD becoming a victim of 
a “forum shopping” process whereby states that wish to engage in automatic information 
exchange do so outside established OECD processes and frameworks thus undermining the 
OECD vis-à-vis its institutional competitors. In sum international organizations must balance 
the need to win support for their agendas given the financial dividends and power such support 




However, the stress on external drivers of change reveals only part of the story. As with the 
OECD’s post-financial crisis tax activism bureaucratic survival and self-interest were central 
factors explaining the change. The desire of OECD officials to maintain their position as the 
expert body for international tax affairs made adjustment to automatic information exchange 
imperative to retaining those discussions inside OECD. A second dimension to this is that 
OECD officials are playing a long game. Pal (2012) notes that the OECD often commences 
work in a particular area by developing relatively anodyne or banal recommendations. These 
recommendations are nonetheless important because they reflect the fact that these issues have 
been aired at an international level and catalyze an implementation process. OECD peer 
reviews start to examine enforcement with the resulting reports used to hone the original 
principles and develop additional dialogues and toolkits. What appear to be trivial agreements 
serve like “crampons” enabling OECD to gain purchase on a slippery surface before climbing 
higher by tackling related problems in the same field (Pal 2012: 138-139). Singly OECD 
agreements may be anemic but multiple agreements in a particular area quickly coalesce to 
become a robust set of rules and the basis for an international regime. The sanguine 
interpretation of the OECD’s promotion of information exchange on request is that it 
represented a staging post towards a more comprehensive system based on automatic 
information exchange. Certainly this is an argument advanced by the OECD secretariat both 
privately and in published reports (Author interview September 2009). Thus, what might first 
appear to be dysfunctional policy transfer may in fact be part of a deliberate strategy on behalf 
of international secretariats to reach desired objectives. This dual strategy of allowing and 
developing resources to support automatic information exchange while insisting that exchange 
on request is the international standard is best understood as a pragmatic compromise in the 
face of deep seated political resistance to automatic information exchange. Getting states to the 
point where exchange of information on request is relatively uncontroversial (seemingly an 
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example of policy dysfunction) may be a necessary intermediate step to securing the ultimate 
aim of tax transparency through automatic information exchange.   
 
Conclusion: Legitimacy, Power and Organizational Adaptation 
This article argues that bureaucratic politics and competition can have a significant influence 
over the substance of standards promoted by international organizations and the extent to 
which they are transferred. However the case study also highlights the influence of other 
factors over both the extent of policy transfer and the role of organizations in influencing 
policy change. To this extent it is important to assess how criticism of an international 
standard can undermine the legitimacy of a sponsoring organization and how a wider set of 
power relations will shape the policy response to such criticism. 
The effectiveness of international organizations is largely contingent on their legitimacy, 
something that is especially true of the OECD given its dependence on peer pressure and other 
‘soft’ modes of governance. Legitimacy is important because international organizations and 
the governance regimes they promote rely on a degree of voluntary participation in order to be 
effective. However legitimacy has many dimensions encompassing a wide range of actors. For 
example, Randall Stone’s (2011) recent study of international organizations conceptualizes 
legitimacy as the ability to gain the consent of participating states. However it can be argued 
that if the authority and power of organizations such as the OECD depend on their reputation 
and their claim to technical expertise then their legitimacy among NGOs and policy experts is 
also significant. So at this level international organizations may be sensitive to an informed and 
sustained campaign which is critical of the standards they promote. Clearly not all civil society 
campaigns are effective, witness the sustained yet largely ineffective campaign to reform IMF 
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conditionality provisions during the 1990s and 2000s. Only through an analysis of underlying 
power dynamics can we begin to understand when international organizations will be 
responsive to external criticism and when such campaign can be ignored. 
There are two broad sets of factors which determine an organization’s vulnerability to criticism 
and protest. As Stone (2011) argues a key factor is the extent to which an organization’s agenda 
is supported by powerful states. If they enjoy this support then poorer countries and weaker 
states will continue to support the regime as part of the price for maintaining a regulatory 
structure over which they exert some influence. The second and related factor concerns the 
extent to which rival organizations offer alternative standards and regimes. If, for example, a 
coalition of states, NGOs and rival organizations cooperate and develop an alternative 
regulatory standard then the possibility of ‘forum shopping’ leaves the original international 
organization in a vulnerable position unless it actively responds to its critics. The preliminary 
evidence suggests that this is the situation in which the OECD finds itself in relation to 
international tax transparency. While proposing a weak standard was a rational response from a 
bureaucratic perspective, technical criticism of the standard in conjunction with the promotion 
of automatic information exchange elsewhere started to undermine the legitimacy of the 
OECD’s regime and left it with little alternative other than to endorse a more robust standard 
grounded in automatic information exchange. 
We can draw two tentative conclusions in relation to our broader interest in the role of 
international organizations in policy transfer. Firstly, we believe the nascent literature on the 
topic should engage with and learn from the literature of bureaucratic politics and how a 
combination of organizational self-interest and bureaucratic construction of governance 
problems provides incentives for an organization to expand, seek resources and prestige. Given 
that ‘success’ is often judged in terms of reaching an international agreement rather than its 
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ultimate effectiveness international organizations have an incentive to develop weak or lowest 
common denominator standards. The result, policies that fail to meet their intended outcomes 
(in this case reducing tax evasion), is an important but seldom recognized form of 
dysfunctional policy transfer. Second, such ineffectiveness has the capacity to undermine an 
international organization’s legitimacy pushing these selfsame bureaucrats to push for changes 
that will protect their newfound resources. The case study presented here demonstrated that   
the OECD’s response to criticisms of its standard cannot be accounted for, as rationalist 
approaches assume, entirely by changes in underlying power dynamics amongst key states 
alone but require an understanding of the bureaucratic politics of the organization, an important 
lesson that future research examining policy transfer initiated or pursued through international 
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